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CONVICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTER: AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
OF OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 
Michael D. Cicchini*
Lawrence T. White??
“So my word is not enough; my promise worthless; 
the fact that I have served my time nothing but the 
emblem of my continuing guilt.”1
Abstract
Despite the time-honored judicial principle that “we try cases, rather 
than persons,” courts routinely allow prosecutors to use defendants’ prior, 
unrelated bad acts at trial. Courts acknowledge that jurors could 
improperly use this other-acts evidence as proof of the defendant’s bad 
character. However, courts theorize that if the other acts are also relevant 
for a permissible purpose—such as proving the defendant’s identity as 
the perpetrator of the charged crime—then a cautionary instruction will 
cure the problem, and any prejudice is “presumed erased from the jury’s 
mind.”
We put this judicial assumption to an empirical test. We recruited 249 
participants to serve as mock jurors in a hypothetical criminal case. After 
reading the identical case summary, jurors were randomly assigned to one 
of two groups, each of which received different evidence on the issue of 
identity. Group A received conclusive proof, in the form of a stipulation,
that if a crime was committed, the defendant was the one who committed 
it. Group A convicted at the rate of 33.1%. Group B received less certain 
evidence of identity in the form of the defendant’s somewhat similar, 
prior conviction, along with a cautionary instruction that this other act 
may not be used as evidence of the defendant’s character. Group B 
convicted at the much higher rate of 48.0%.
The difference in conviction rates is statistically significant. Further, 
jurors in Group B were also more confident in their verdicts despite 
receiving less certain evidence of guilt and a cautionary instruction. 
These empirical findings demonstrate that cautionary instructions are not 
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effective, and jurors will use other-acts evidence for impermissible 
purposes including, for example, the forbidden character inference. 
Given this, we discuss several pretrial strategies for defense counsel to 
limit the prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibits the government 
from introducing evidence at trial of a criminal defendant’s bad character. 
Instead, to win a conviction, the prosecutor must prove what the 
defendant actually did with regard to the charged crime. What the 
2
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defendant may have done in the past and, more specifically, what kind of 
person he is should not serve as the basis for a new conviction.2
Despite this time-honored prohibition on character evidence, courts 
still permit prosecutors to use a defendant’s prior, unrelated bad acts at 
trial. Courts acknowledge that such other-acts evidence goes to the 
defendant’s character; however, as long as the prosecutor offers the other 
acts ostensibly for a permissible purpose—such as proof of the 
defendant’s identity, intent, or absence of accident with regard to the 
charged crime—courts typically allow the prosecutor to use the 
evidence.3
Due to the highly prejudicial nature of other-acts evidence, courts 
instruct jurors that they are not to use the defendant’s other acts to decide 
that he is a bad person and is therefore guilty of the charged crime. Rather, 
jurors are to use the other acts only for a limited purpose—for example, 
to decide whether the defendant is the perpetrator or whether the 
defendant’s actions were intentional or accidental. Once a court gives this 
cautionary instruction, all unfair prejudice is presumed to be wiped from 
jurors’ minds.4
Given the obvious incompatibility between this judicial assumption 
and the way the human mind actually works, we decided to conduct a 
controlled study on other-acts evidence, cautionary instructions, and the 
issue of identity. We recruited 249 participants to serve as mock jurors in 
a hypothetical criminal case. After reading a case summary—including 
the elements of the crime, a summary of trial testimony, and an 
instruction on the burden of proof—participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two groups, each of which received different evidence on the 
issue of identity.5
Group A (N = 124) received conclusive proof on the issue of identity 
in the form of a stipulation and convicted the defendant at a rate of 33.1%. 
Group B (N = 125) received far less certain evidence on the issue of 
identity: the defendant’s somewhat similar, prior bad act, along with a 
cautionary instruction that such evidence should not be used to decide 
that the defendant has a bad character and is therefore guilty of the 
charged crime. Even though the defendant’s other act was inconclusive 
evidence of identity and was accompanied by a cautionary instruction, 
Group B convicted the defendant at a rate of 48.0%.6
Group B’s conviction rate was nearly 50% higher than Group A’s, a 
statistically significant difference. Jurors in Group B were also more 
certain they had chosen the correct verdict. These empirical findings 
                                                                                                                     
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
6. See infra Section IV.E.
3
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provide strong evidence that the courts’ assumption is wrong. The 
evidence demonstrates that cautionary instructions are not effective in 
limiting the prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. Rather, jurors use 
other acts for impermissible purposes, such as determining that the 
defendant has a bad character and, for that reason, is guilty of the crime 
charged.7
Part I of this Article discusses the policy behind the prohibition on 
character evidence. Part II discusses the rule on other-acts evidence and 
explains how prosecutors circumvent the character-evidence prohibition 
by ostensibly using the other acts for permissible purposes. Part III then 
discusses, and gives examples of, the cautionary instructions that are 
intended to protect the defendant from the impermissible character 
inference associated with other acts. 
Part IV of this Article describes our controlled study, including our 
hypothesis, our study design, and our empirical findings. Part V discusses 
the findings in more detail and further explores the prejudicial impact of 
other-acts evidence. Part VI then offers pretrial strategies for defense 
counsel when dealing with other-acts evidence. These strategies include 
the use of our empirical findings to demonstrate that the unfair prejudice 
of other acts substantially outweighs any probative value. Finally, Part 
VII discusses the limitations of our study design and considers possible 
alternative methodologies for other researchers.     
I. “WE TRY CASES, RATHER THAN PERSONS”
A deeply rooted principle in criminal law is that a jury should not 
convict a defendant of a crime because of his prior, unrelated bad acts. 
Rather, a jury should judge a defendant on the evidence specific to the 
crime with which he is charged. “[I]n our system of jurisprudence, we try 
cases, rather than persons, and thus a jury may look only to the evidence 
of the events in question, not defendants’ prior acts in reaching its 
verdict.”8
There are many good reasons to cling to this basic tenet of criminal 
law. If jurors hear evidence of a defendant’s other acts, they may convict 
not because they believe he is guilty of the charged crime, but rather to 
                                                                                                                     
7. See infra Part V.
8. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)). For a history of the rule prohibiting the use of other acts to 
prove a defendant’s character, see Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 
404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 951–
58 (1988) (explaining the prohibition “has its roots in Great Britain’s Treason Act of 1695”). 
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punish him (again) for his prior misdeeds.9 In effect, the defendant would 
never be able to atone for his other acts. This, of course, would be 
“antithetical to the precept that ‘a defendant starts his life afresh when he 
stands before a jury.’”10
Similarly, jurors may use the other-acts evidence to convict the 
defendant preemptively, reasoning that, although he may be “innocent 
momentarily,” society must be protected from the crimes he might 
commit in the future.11 This desire for the illusion of security is a strong 
one, and some prosecutors are willing to exploit it in order to win 
convictions.12
Beyond these risks, however, the most significant risk of other-acts 
evidence is that jurors will “generaliz[e] a defendant’s earlier bad act into
bad character and tak[e] that as raising the odds that he did the . . . act 
now charged.”13 To illustrate this, assume that a defendant is charged 
with battery but claims he acted in self-defense. If jurors were to hear 
evidence of his prior, unrelated battery conviction, they may well find 
him guilty of the current battery charge—not because they are persuaded 
by the accuser’s testimony, but because the defendant committed a prior 
battery. This can cause jurors to conclude that the defendant is a violent 
or hot-tempered person and is therefore guilty of the charged crime.  
Arguably, a defendant’s character could be relevant evidence. After 
all, most battery crimes are committed by hot-tempered persons; it
follows that a defendant’s character trait for being hot-tempered is 
relevant to show that he “is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the 
crime.”14 So the problem is not that “character is irrelevant; on the 
                                                                                                                     
9. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. 
Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)) (discussing the risk that the jury, “uncertain of 
guilt . . . will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment”). 
10. People v. Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Mich. 1998) (quoting People v. Zackowitz,
254 N.Y. 192, 197 (1930)). 
11. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180–81.
12. See, e.g., Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that “the 
prosecutor could have been understood to be telling the jury to convict irrespective of Hennon’s 
guilt or innocence, lest an acquittal be interpreted as a green light for street gangs and drive-by 
killings”).
13. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).
14. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). However, this simplistic 
reasoning may be flawed. See Linda S. Eads et al., Getting It Right: The Trial of Sexual Assault 
and Child Molestation Cases Under Federal Rules of Evidence 413–15, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 169, 
171 (2000) (“[W]e risk inaccuracy when we assume consistency of behavior over time and 
circumstances . . . .”). Further, individuals all around us defy their fundamental character and 
control their violent urges on a daily basis. State and federal governments even tout this fact to 
justify their massive expenditures of taxpayer dollars on correctional programs. See, e.g., NAT’L
INST. OF CORRECTIONS, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT: A REVIEW AND DISCUSSION FOR 
CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONALS 17 (2007), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021657.pdf (explaining 
5
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contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury, and to so 
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny 
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”15
Given this, the general ban on character evidence is a hallmark of a 
system that values fundamental fairness and the appearance of fairness. 
And while it is true that modern rules of evidence have carved into this 
time-honored principle to some extent,16 courts still continue to honor, at 
least superficially,17 the idea that a defendant should only be convicted 
“for what he did, not for who he is.”18 However, even when this character-
evidence prohibition remains fully intact, courts still permit prosecutors 
to use a defendant’s other acts at trial—provided the other acts have some 
valid purpose in addition to proving the defendant’s character. In fact, as 
discussed below, the use of other-acts evidence has become incredibly 
common, if not the norm.
II. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Most commonly, other-acts evidence takes the form of a defendant’s 
prior conviction for a similarly-named crime, as in the battery example
above. However, prosecutors can use other-acts evidence at a defendant’s 
trial even if he was found not guilty of the other acts and even if the state 
previously declined to prosecute the other acts. Further, while other-acts 
evidence is usually similar to the charged crime, it need not be. And the
other acts—regardless of whether they are similar in nature to the current 
charge—may involve the same alleged victim or someone entirely 
different. Most significantly—and unlike the use of a defendant’s prior 
convictions for impeachment purposes—other acts are admissible 
regardless of whether the defendant testifies in his own defense.19
                                                                                                                     
offenders “learn to identify those factors that create their anger and role-play ways to competently 
use self-control techniques”). 
15. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475–76 (emphasis added). Worse yet, “[i]f the criminal justice 
system convicts people based on who they are, not what they have done, we are all at 
risk . . . . [and w]e increase the risk of reinforcing errors based on fallacious stereotypical 
judgment.” Eads et al., supra note 14, at 176 (emphasis added).
16. See Eads et al., supra note 14, at 177 (“[S]ome states have recognized for decades the 
lustful disposition exception to the general ban on character evidence in cases involving sexual 
assault.”). In Wisconsin, for example, the prosecutor may use a defendant’s prior, first-degree 
sexual assault conviction “as evidence of the person’s character in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.” WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(2) (2017) (emphasis added).
17. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Spreigl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled Rule, 35 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1368, 1372 (2009) (arguing that Minnesota’s rule on other-acts evidence 
“only pretends to enforce some ill-defined prohibition on character evidence”). 
18. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977). 
19. For a discussion of the overwhelming variety of other-acts evidence, see DANIEL 
BLINKA, EVIDENCE—WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES § 404.602 (4th ed. 2017). One of the most 
common types of other-acts evidence is a defendant’s prior conviction for a completely unrelated 
6
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The rules governing the admissibility of other-acts evidence are 
highly nuanced, vary significantly from state to state, and are 
inconsistently applied even within states.20 In most jurisdictions,
admissibility is generally governed by a rule very similar to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b), Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts, which states:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or 
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses . . . . This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.21
These enumerated, permissible purposes are not exclusive. In fact, 
except for the prohibition on using such evidence to prove character, there 
is virtually no limit on how the creative prosecutor can use a defendant’s 
other acts at trial.22
Returning to our earlier battery example where the defendant claims 
self-defense, the prosecutor could simply offer the previous battery 
conviction not to prove the defendant’s character trait for being hot-
tempered, but rather to demonstrate his identity as the perpetrator; his
                                                                                                                     
but similarly-named crime. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(1) (Other-acts evidence “is 
admissible without regard to whether the victim of the crime that is the subject of the proceeding 
is the same as the victim of the similar act.”). 
20. See, e.g., Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1372 (“The current [other-acts] doctrine in 
Minnesota is a Potemkin village.”); see also Robert Cameron, The Modified Just Rule: A New 
Standard for the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under Rules 403 and 
404(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence, 53 MONT. L. REV. 133, 133 (1992) (“In Montana other 
crimes evidence has been subject to widely varying standards of admissibility.”). 
21. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). A defendant’s crimes, wrongs, or other acts may also be 
admissible under other rules of evidence, including FED. R. EVID. 413, 414, 608(b), 609. These 
rules may admit the same evidence but in varying level of detail, for different purposes, or through 
different methods of proof. See infra note 36 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
using a defendant’s prior conviction as impeachment evidence under FED. R. EVID. 609 and 
comparable state statutes.  
22. States that follow the so-called inclusionary approach allow the use of other acts for any
purpose other than character. See State v. Hunt, 666 N.W.2d 771, 787 (Wis. 2003) (allowing other 
acts to show “context” and “the victim’s state of mind,” as well as “to corroborate information 
provided to the police” and “to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses”); David F. 
Guldenschuh, Federal Rules of Evidence – Rule 404(b) Limits the Admission of Other Crimes 
Evidence, Under an Inclusionary Approach, to Cases Where It Is Relevant to an Issue in Dispute,
55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 574, 574 (1980).
7
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intent to cause bodily harm; and the lack of accident in causing bodily 
harm. Further, the prosecutor can also use the previous battery conviction 
to demonstrate that the defendant did not act in self-defense.
While early courts cautioned that other-acts evidence should be used 
“sparingly and only when reasonably necessary,”23 the floodgates have 
since been opened wide. The courts’ original position on other-acts 
evidence “has been remolded and chiseled down in recent years to the 
point that this once well-settled exclusion now serves as more of an 
exception rather than the rule.”24 Today, once the prosecutor offers the 
other acts ostensibly for a permissible purpose, the “concrete result is that 
propensity evidence is regularly allowed in the guise of 
404(b) . . . evidence.”25 More to the point, other-acts evidence is simply 
“character evidence in disguise.”26
In reality, a defendant’s other acts are usually far more probative of 
his character than any of the delineated statutory purposes. For example, 
in the hypothetical battery case, would the defendant’s unrelated, prior 
battery conviction really prove his identity, intent, lack of accident, or 
absence of self-defense in the current battery case? Usually it does not. 
Typically, the other act involved different facts and circumstances, was 
committed against a different person, and occurred months or even years 
earlier—all of which dramatically limit its relevance to the charged 
crime.
In fact, courts “routinely admit [other-acts] evidence whose relevance 
depends primarily on propensity so long as it ultimately goes to prove 
one of the listed ‘other purposes’ in 404(b).”27 It does not matter that the 
other-acts evidence goes to the defendant’s character; as long as the 
prosecutor is able to articulate one of the permissible purposes in addition 
to character, the court will likely admit the evidence.28
                                                                                                                     
23. State v. Murphy, 524 N.W.2d 924, 928 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing Wisconsin’s 
landmark case Whitty v. State, 149 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1967)). 
24. Edward Pare III, Restoring the Character Evidence Rule: Reconsidering Evidence of 
Crimes, Wrongs, and Other Acts in Rhode Island, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 399, 399 (2016) 
(citing Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L.
REV. 775, 776–77 (2013)). 
25. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1387. While other-acts evidence is, in theory, 
admissible against the government’s witnesses as well, a double standard has emerged. See Jayna 
M. Mathieu, Note, Reverse-Spreigl Evidence: Challenging Defendants’ Obligation to Exceed 
Prosecutorial Standards to Admit Evidence of Third Party Guilt, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1033, 1034–
35 (2002) (“[C]ourts tend to reach different results in Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl cases. Contrary 
to a Spreigl scenario, when defendants attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence, trial courts 
frequently exclude it.”).
26. People v. Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 794 (Mich. 1998).
27. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1371.
28. See id. at 1385–86.
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But given the obvious prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence, 
coupled with the mantra that “we try cases, rather than persons,”29 how
can courts justify the routine admission of other-acts evidence at trial? 
III. CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS
In the face of the dual purpose for other-acts evidence—the 
impermissible character inference on the one hand and a permissible, 
statutory purpose on the other—courts typically deal with the character 
aspect of the evidence by issuing a cautionary instruction. Once a 
cautionary instruction “is properly given by the court, prejudice to a 
defendant is presumed erased from the jury’s mind.”30
What is this cautionary instruction that has the power to instantly and 
permanently eliminate all traces of improper influence on the jury? It is 
often a short instruction, sometimes given at the time the other-acts 
evidence is presented, cautioning the jury that the evidence is only 
admissible for certain purposes such as proof of identity, intent, lack of 
accident, and absence of self-defense.
Cautionary instructions—often called limiting instructions or curative 
instructions—vary greatly across jurisdictions. The only thing the 
instructions have in common is that each will name the purpose or 
purposes for which the jury may use the evidence. Beyond that, some 
instructions will caution the jury that “[y]ou must not convict the 
defendant here because you think he is guilty of other bad conduct.”31
Other instructions are rather cumbersome—and probably 
incomprehensible to many jurors—warning that “[y]ou must not consider 
this act to determine the defendant’s character or character trait, or to 
determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the defendant’s 
character or character trait and therefore committed the charged 
offense.”32
                                                                                                                     
29. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)).
30. State v. Shillcutt, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). State 
court decisions throughout the country are littered with similar, but less extreme, assumptions 
about cautionary instructions. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 2006) 
(“[A]ny potential prejudice was mitigated by the limiting instruction given to the jury.”). Further, 
“[u]nder the stewardship of Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts, the [United States 
Supreme] Court has shown no hesitation in asserting that juries can and will disregard 
inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so.” Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal 
Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 179 
(2012).
31. MICH. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.11(3) (MICH. SUP. CT. COMM. ON MODEL 
CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1993).
32. REVISED CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 26A (ST. B. OF ARIZ. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION 
COMM. 2016).
9
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Some instructions are incredibly brief and do little more than tell the 
jury the obvious: “the defendant is not on trial for a crime, wrong, or act 
that is not included in the indictment.”33 Finally, other instructions are 
outright nonsensical and even self-contradictory. One federal court 
instruction tells the jury that it may consider the other acts as proof of the 
defendant’s intent or motive to commit the crime for which he is on trial; 
however, it then instructs the jury that “[y]ou may not consider this 
evidence as evidence of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is now 
on trial.”34
Even assuming the trial judge reads a cautionary instruction that is 
technically accurate, internally consistent, and comprehensible to the 
average juror, it seems unlikely that such an instruction could erase the 
prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. Jurors are not computers. They 
are probably not able to parse the evidence into its permissible and 
impermissible purposes and then disregard the impermissible purposes as 
if they were deleting unwanted files from a computer hard drive. That is, 
curative “instructions are premised on a belief in people’s ability to exert 
formidable control over their cognitive processing. This assumption runs 
contrary to the research.”35
Given this gap between what the courts assume about cautionary 
instructions—that all prejudice will be erased from the jury’s mind—and
how the human mind actually works,36 we decided to put the other-acts 
                                                                                                                     
33. FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIM. CASES § 2.4 (FLA. B. 2016).
34. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NINTH CIR. (NINTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM.
2010) § 2.10 (emphasis added). 
35. Simon, supra note 30, at 178 (discussing numerous studies of the effectiveness of 
instructions to ignore evidence or to use evidence only for limited purposes).
36. Much of the research examines cautionary instructions for the impeachment of a 
defendant with his prior convictions. See Eads et al., supra note 14, at 198 (discussing several 
studies); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect 
of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1353, 1359 n.17 (2009) (collecting several studies); Simon, supra note 30, at 176–79
(discussing several studies and cases). From a psychological standpoint, impeachment with a prior 
conviction is similar to the admission of other-acts evidence in terms of its impact on jurors’ 
perception of the defendant. However, there can also be significant differences. As discussed in 
Part II of this Article, other-acts evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) need not have resulted in a 
criminal conviction—or even be criminal in nature—in order to be admissible. And other-acts 
evidence typically involves detailed testimony by witnesses, whereas prior-conviction 
impeachment evidence under FED. R. EVID. 609 may consist only of the fact and name of the 
crime of conviction. Additionally, state-court rules on prior-conviction impeachment evidence 
may restrict such information even further, allowing only the fact of a conviction without naming 
the specific crime. See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977,
1987–88 (2016). And of course, the cautionary instructions will also differ, given that 
impeachment evidence is used for credibility, whereas other acts are used for such purposes as 
identity, intent, lack of accident, and absence of self-defense, among others. FED. R. EVID. 404(b);
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
10
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cautionary instruction to an empirical test. Our study, discussed below, 
was approved by Beloit College’s Institutional Review Board.
IV. THE STUDY
A. Hypothesis
We hypothesize that other-acts cautionary instructions are not 
effective and that jurors who are presented with other-acts evidence will, 
despite receiving a cautionary instruction, use the evidence for 
impermissible purposes that increase the likelihood of conviction.
B. Participants
To test our hypothesis, we recruited 250 study participants through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online platform for conducting social 
science research.37 Mechanical Turk has many advantages, including 
“easy access to a large, stable, and diverse subject pool, the low cost of 
doing experiments, and faster iteration between developing theory and 
executing experiments.”38 Further, several studies have found a high 
degree of similarity between the judgments and behaviors of Mechanical 
Turk “workers” and of participants recruited in more conventional ways, 
such as through university subject pools.39
These 250 participants served as mock jurors by reading a case 
summary and rendering a verdict in a hypothetical criminal case. All 
participants were required to be adults and U.S. citizens. To ensure data 
quality, we monitored the participants and rejected those who completed 
the task in fewer than three minutes; we immediately replaced them with 
new participants in order to maintain our desired sample size. After the 
data were collected, we discovered one participant had not indicated 
whether he was a U.S. citizen; we discarded the participant’s data, leaving 
us with a total of 249 mock jurors. 
Our sample was large and diverse. Participants hailed from 42 
different states. Fifty-two percent were female. Participants’ ages ranged 
from 20 years to 73 years; the mean (average) age was 34.8 years, and 
the median age (50th percentile) was 31 years. The ethnic composition of 
the sample was also diverse: 72% non-Hispanic whites, 8% African-
Americans, 6% Hispanics, 9% Asian-Americans, 4% mixed race, and 1% 
identifying as other. Sixty-two percent of the participants have at least a
four-year college degree, while an additional 29% have completed some 
college. Fourteen percent reported having prior jury experience.
                                                                                                                     
37. Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. 1 (2012). 
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 3–4.
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C. Study Design
All mock jurors received a written case summary of a hypothetical 
criminal trial. The case summary described two adults who met and 
interacted at a party, which resulted in an accusation of a misdemeanor 
fourth-degree sexual assault, i.e., the defendant’s sexual touching of the 
alleged victim without her consent. All mock jurors received the 
following information: an instruction on the charged crime, including its 
elements; a 767-word summary of the testimony from the accuser and the 
defendant, who were the two witnesses; and an instruction on the state’s 
burden of proof. 
More specifically, the accuser, Emily V., testified that she met the 
defendant, John D., at a house party. At one point during the evening, she 
went into a room with John and another couple—a man and a woman. 
Emily had been drinking alcohol, “was slightly intoxicated,” and was 
sitting on a couch with John while the couple sat near them in chairs. The 
woman then left the room. John and the man were talking, and Emily fell 
asleep. When she awoke, a man was standing over her and touching her 
buttocks without her consent. She believed this man was John, the 
defendant. After she told the man to “stop it,” there was a short struggle.
The man then left the room. Emily learned John’s full name from 
someone at the party and promptly reported the incident to the police.
The defendant, John D., also testified. He admitted to drinking alcohol 
at the party and also to consuming other drugs earlier in the day. John 
acknowledged being in the room with Emily, the other man, and the other 
woman. After Emily fell asleep and the other couple left the room, John 
stood over Emily and checked on her to make sure she was okay. After 
she responded to him, he left the room and then left the party. He denied 
touching Emily’s buttocks “in any way or for any purpose” and also 
denied struggling with her.
D. Identity Evidence
If a crime was committed, the identity of the perpetrator was not clear 
from the case summary. The accuser was intoxicated and, at one point, 
even fell asleep. She was also unfamiliar with the defendant; she had 
never met or even seen him before the night of the party and did not know 
his first name until she later learned it from another person. Further, there 
were other people at the party including the other man who was in the 
same room with the accuser and the defendant. Finally, the defendant 
denied the allegation and testified that, after checking on the accuser, he 
simply left the room and the party, and no assault had occurred up to that 
point.
Given the possibility that, if a crime occurred, someone other than the
defendant committed it, identity was an issue in the case. With regard to 
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identity evidence, mock jurors were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups, Group A (N = 124) and Group B (N = 125). Mock jurors in Group 
A received a stipulation on identity, which was provided immediately 
after the accuser’s testimony. The stipulation read as follows: 
The prosecutor and the defense attorney have stipulated 
or agreed to the existence of certain facts, and you must 
accept these facts as conclusively proved. In this case, the 
prosecutor and defense attorney have stipulated to the 
following facts:40
1. The defendant, John D. was the person on the couch 
with Emily V.
2. The other man that was in the room left the room just 
as Emily V. was falling asleep.
3. The defendant, John D. was the person standing over 
Emily V.
4. At no time did the other man return to the room, and at 
no time did any other man ever enter the room.
Group A’s stipulation was designed to remove all doubt about the 
identity of the perpetrator. That is, if the jurors believed that a sexual 
assault was committed, the crime could only have been committed by the 
defendant. The breadth of the stipulation removes all speculation that the 
crime could have been committed by the other man that was in the room 
or by some other, unidentified man at the party. Group A also received 
an additional instruction, immediately before the burden of proof 
instruction, reminding mock jurors that the term “evidence” includes the 
stipulation: 
Evidence – Definition and Weight
“Evidence” includes the sworn testimony of witnesses 
and any stipulations entered into between the parties. All
witnesses in this case were sworn before testifying. You are 
the sole judges of the “credibility,” that is, the believability, 
                                                                                                                     
40. This instruction is closely modeled after WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 162 (UNIV.
WIS. LAW SCH. 2015). The enumerated facts on which the parties agreed are, of course, specific 
to the facts of the case.  
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of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 
testimony.41
The mock jurors in Group B, however, received different evidence to 
prove identity. Group B was presented with the defendant’s other act: a 
prior conviction for misdemeanor, fourth-degree sexual assault. This 
information was provided immediately after the accuser’s testimony:  
Testimony of Police Detective L. Hamilton
Hamilton is a police detective in a different county where 
the defendant, John D., used to live. Hamilton testified that 
he knew John, and was able to identify him in court.
Hamilton testified that, about three years ago in 2013, John 
D. was charged and convicted of fourth degree sexual assault 
for sexually touching a young woman, Heather B., without 
her consent. John entered a plea of “no contest” and did not 
go to trial. Hamilton read the following portion of John’s 
written statement from 2013 about that incident with Heather 
B. John had written: “I met Heather twice before, and I saw 
her again last night and we went back to her apartment. We 
had some drinks and I was giving her a backrub. Heather was 
pretty drunk, and so was I, but she seemed to be enjoying the 
backrub. I reached around and touched her chest over her 
clothes. After a while I reached down the back of her pants 
and was touching her butt. She seemed pretty into it and 
didn’t say ‘stop’ so I kept doing it. I thought she was into it,
but she might have been too drunk to really know what was 
happening. After a few minutes, though, she realized what 
was happening and told me to ‘stop.’ I didn’t stop right 
away, because I didn’t know if she really meant it. But I 
stopped once I was sure she was really serious. She accused 
me of touching her vagina, too, but I never did that. I only 
touched her chest and her butt.”
Group B also received the same jury instruction on the definition of 
“evidence.” However, Group B’s instruction did not include the reference 
to the stipulation as Group B did not receive a stipulation. Instead, Group 
B received a cautionary instruction on the other-acts evidence. We 
selected the most pro-defendant cautionary instruction that we located 
during our research. The instruction informs the jury that it is up to them 
                                                                                                                     
41. This instruction is an abbreviated instruction based on a combination of two Wisconsin 
Criminal Jury Instructions. WIS. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 103, 300 (UNIV. WIS. LAW 
SCH. 2015).
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to decide whether the other act occurred. It also instructs them that the 
defendant’s other act can only be used for the purpose of identity, and not 
for any other purpose. It also specifically warns them not to use the other-
acts evidence to judge the defendant’s character or to convict the 
defendant based on his character.42 The instruction, in its entirety, reads 
as follows:
Cautionary Instruction
Evidence has been presented regarding other conduct of
the defendant for which the defendant is not on trial.
Specifically, evidence has been presented that the 
defendant, in 2013, committed fourth degree sexual assault 
against a different person, Heather B. If you find that this 
conduct did occur, you should consider it only on the issue 
of identity.
You may not consider this evidence to conclude that the 
defendant has a certain character or a certain character trait 
and that the defendant acted in conformity with that trait or 
character with respect to the offense charged in this case 
involving alleged victim Emily V.
The evidence was received on the issue of identity, that 
is, whether the prior conduct of the defendant is so similar to 
the offense charged that it tends to identify the defendant as 
the one who committed the offense charged.
You may consider this evidence only for the purpose(s) I 
have described, giving it the weight you determine it 
deserves. It is not to be used to conclude that the defendant 
is a bad person and for that reason is guilty of the offense 
charged.43
                                                                                                                     
42. Even under today’s rules of evidence that have chipped away at the character-evidence 
prohibition, a prior misdemeanor—fourth-degree sexual assault conviction for touching a 
person’s buttocks—would likely not be admissible to prove the defendant’s character. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting the use of the defendant’s prior sexual assault, when it involved 
contact with the “genitals or anus,” to prove character); see also WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)(2)
(2017) (permitting the use of the defendant’s prior, first-degree sexual assault conviction to prove 
character). Therefore, when character evidence is prohibited, as it is in the vast majority of 
criminal cases, the prosecutor and trial judge would have to fit the defendant’s prior conviction 
into one of the delineated, statutory purposes such as identity. 
43. WIS. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 275 (UNIV. WIS. LAW SCH. 2015).
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Between the two types of identity evidence, the stipulation provided 
to Group A is far stronger, as it forecloses all speculation about the 
identity of the perpetrator and provides conclusive proof that, if a crime 
was committed, the defendant committed it. Such a stipulation is 
probably the strongest of all types of evidence that could possibly be used 
to prove identity.  
Group B, on the other hand, received evidence of the defendant’s other 
act, which is much weaker evidence of identity. That is, the cautionary 
instruction framed the issue as “whether the prior conduct of the 
defendant is so similar to the offense charged that it tends to identify the 
defendant as the one who committed the offense charged.”44
While the defendant’s other act in the case summary was somewhat
similar—it involved touching without consent after drinking alcohol—
there were also numerous differences. For example, the other act involved 
a person the defendant had met on two prior occasions, whereas the
charged crime involved a person the defendant had just met for the first 
time. The other act occurred at the victim’s house where the defendant 
was giving her a backrub, whereas the alleged crime occurred at a house 
party with others present and where the accuser had fallen asleep.
Because Group A’s evidence on identity (the stipulation) was 
conclusive, Group A should have the higher conviction rate of the two 
groups. That is, because the other act provided to Group B had both 
similarities and dissimilarities to the charged crime, it is far less reliable 
evidence of identity. Therefore, if the cautionary instruction is truly 
effective, and the jurors in Group B considered the other act “only on the 
issue of identity,”45 then the conviction rate of Group A should be higher 
than that of Group B. 
We hypothesized, however, that the cautionary instruction will not be 
effective, and that jurors will use the other acts for impermissible
purposes such as punishing the defendant for his past wrongs;
preemptively convicting him in order to prevent future bad acts; or
concluding that he possesses a bad character and is therefore guilty of the 
charged crime. If our hypothesis is correct, then Group B’s conviction 
rate should be higher, even though Group B received weaker evidence on 
the issue of identity. 
E. Findings
After receiving a burden of proof instruction, each mock juror 
rendered a verdict of guilty or not guilty. In Group A, which received 
conclusive proof of identity in the form of a stipulation, 41 of 124 mock 
jurors returned verdicts of guilt for a group conviction rate of 33.1%. In 
                                                                                                                     
44. Id. (emphasis added). 
45. Id.
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Group B, which received evidence of the defendant’s somewhat similar 
other act, 60 of 125 mock jurors returned verdicts of guilt for a group
conviction rate of 48.0%. The conviction rate among jurors who learned 
of the other act (Group B) was nearly 50% higher than the conviction rate 
among jurors who did not know about the defendant’s earlier conviction 
but instead received the conclusive stipulation on identity (Group A).
The Z test for the difference between the two proportions—33.1% and 
48.0%—produced a Z score of -2.4. This result is significant at the p <
.02 level, with an exact p-value of 0.016. The p-value measures the 
probability of a Type I error, or the risk of obtaining a false positive when 
testing a hypothesis, given the two sample sizes and the difference in 
conviction rates between the two groups. In plain language, we are more 
than 98% certain (1 – p) that the observed difference in conviction rates 
between Groups A and B is a real difference that did not occur by chance.
Additionally, after participants rendered their verdict, they reported
how certain they were (on a 10-point scale) that they had made a correct 
decision. Mock jurors in Group B—the group that received information 
about the defendant’s other act—were more certain (mean score of 7.0) 
in their verdict than were jurors in Group A (mean score of 6.4). This 
difference is statistically significant at the p < .04 level. In plain language, 
jurors who heard evidence of the defendant’s other act felt more certain 
their verdict was correct, even though they were provided with less 
persuasive evidence on the issue of identity.
We also uncovered several subsidiary findings not directly related to 
the main purpose of our study: (a) women were no more likely than men 
to vote guilty; (b) there were no statistically significant relationships 
between a participant’s verdict and his or her age, ethnicity, or prior jury 
experience; (c) across education categories, better-educated participants 
were less likely to vote guilty, although the trend was not pronounced; 
and (d) mock jurors who voted guilty, regardless of the group to which 
they were randomly assigned, were considerably more certain that they 
had made the correct decision (a mean score of 7.7 on a 10-point scale, 
compared to a mean score of 6.1 among participants who voted not guilty, 
p < .001).
Finally, participants also answered an attention-check question that
tested their recollection of the elements of the charged crime. The 
question included five potential elements, only three of which were 
correct. The attention-check results were encouraging, as 88% of all 
participants correctly identified the elements of the charged crime.46
Those who voted not guilty were correct 91% of the time, while those 
who voted guilty were correct 84% of the time. This difference is 
                                                                                                                     
46. Our standard for a correct answer was high; a mock juror who identified the correct 
elements of the charged crime, but also an incorrect element, was classified as “incorrect.” 
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marginally significant (Z = -1.7, p = .09); it suggests that those mock 
jurors who paid closer attention to the legal elements of the charged crime 
(fourth-degree sexual assault) were less likely to convict.
V. DISCUSSION: THE IMPACT OF OTHER ACTS
After conceding that jurors are likely to use other-acts evidence for 
impermissible purposes, courts typically permit such evidence and 
address its dangers by issuing a cautionary instruction.47 The courts 
simply assume that this cautionary instruction will cure all unfair 
prejudice to the defendant. Our findings, however, strongly support our 
hypothesis that such cautionary instructions for other-acts evidence are 
not effective, that jurors will consider a defendant’s other acts for 
impermissible purposes such as character, and that such consideration 
will lead jurors to convict at a higher rate.   
More specifically, Group A in our study convicted at a rate of 33.1%,
which should have served as a ceiling on the conviction rate, as this group 
received a stipulation that conclusively proved the defendant’s identity. 
There is simply no better evidence to establish the defendant’s identity 
than a clear, all-encompassing stipulation between the parties.   
However, Group B, which received less-certain evidence on 
identity—the defendant’s somewhat similar, three-year-old other act—
convicted at a rate of 48.0%. Had the cautionary instruction been 
effective, i.e., had the jurors considered the other act only on the issue of 
identity as they were instructed, Group B’s conviction rate should have 
been no higher than Group A’s. Instead, it was much higher, and the 
difference was highly significant (p < .02). Further, jurors in Group B, 
after learning of the defendant’s prior conviction, were more confident in 
their verdicts (p < .04).
This empirical evidence debunks the common judicial assumption that 
a cautionary instruction on other-acts evidence will erase all prejudice 
from the jurors’ minds. Our findings demonstrate that other-acts evidence 
can lead jurors to convict a defendant not for what he has done, but for 
who he is. Even the best, most comprehensive other-acts cautionary 
instruction is about as effective as “throw[ing] a skunk into the jury box” 
and “instruct[ing] the jury not to smell it.”48
Now that we have empirically confirmed our hypothesis and 
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of cautionary instructions for other-acts 
evidence, the next question is: What can defense lawyers do to protect a 
                                                                                                                     
47. See State v. Payano, 768 N.W.2d 832, 862 (Wis. 2009) (“[P]recedent suggests that 
cautionary jury instructions can go a long way in limiting the unfair prejudice that may result from 
the admission of other acts evidence.”).
48. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
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defendant’s due process and other constitutional rights when the state 
attempts to introduce other-acts evidence at trial?
VI.  PRETRIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE DEFENSE
Litigating other-acts evidence requires an in-depth knowledge of the 
particular state’s applicable rules and case law.49 However, the empirical 
findings, case law, and secondary sources discussed in this Article point 
to three, interrelated strategies for defense counsel’s consideration.  
A. Relevance
Defense counsel should consider arguing that the defendant’s other 
acts are not relevant and should therefore be excluded. Relevance can be 
broken down into at least two parts.
One aspect of relevance is whether the permissible purpose—the 
purpose for which the other-acts evidence is being offered—is in dispute. 
For example, if the state is prosecuting a defendant for domestic violence 
against his or her spouse, then identity will not be a contested issue at 
trial. Therefore, the defendant’s prior battery conviction should not be 
admissible for that purpose. Stated more broadly, “[i]f the state offers 
other crimes evidence as relevant to specific elements of the crime 
charged, and those elements are not at issue, the other crimes evidence is 
inadmissible.”50
However, not all jurisdictions follow this rule. Instead, some simply 
ignore this aspect of the relevancy analysis and permit the state to use 
other-acts evidence even for issues that are not contested.51 To make 
matters more complicated, the laws vary not only across states but 
sometimes within states.52 For example, one court conceded that “[t]he 
conflict between our decisions . . . poses a question of the precedent to be 
followed.”53
                                                                                                                     
49. See, e.g., Ruth Miller, Other Crimes Evidence: Relevance Reexamined, 16 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 371, 385–88 (1983) (discussing the various standards used in Illinois); Pare III, supra
note 24, at 399–402 (arguing for the “clear and convincing” standard instead of the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard in Rhode Island). Not only does the law in each state 
and federal jurisdiction vary, but this Article is not intended to be comprehensive with regard to 
litigating other-acts motions. There are several issues not even addressed in this Article, including 
the notice requirement for the use of other-acts evidence and the burden of proof required to 
demonstrate that the other acts actually occurred.
50. State v. Bedker, 440 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
51. See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1400.
52. See id. at 1372 (“[T]he history of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of 
substantial confusion. . . . [T]he rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its 
history.”).
53. State v. Clark, 507 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see also Sampsell-Jones, 
supra note 17, at 1372 (“[T]he history of the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere is a history of 
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The second aspect of relevancy is whether the other acts are relevant 
to establish the stated, permissible purpose. For example, if the state 
prosecutes a defendant for a masked robbery where the identity of the 
perpetrator is truly in dispute, the question then becomes whether other-
acts evidence (such as the defendant’s prior robbery conviction) is 
relevant in establishing the defendant as the perpetrator. This analysis 
typically hinges on the similarity between the other act and the charged 
crime: the greater the similarity, the more likely the other act is to be 
relevant and, therefore, admissible.54 One problem in determining 
whether two things are similar, however, is the vagueness of the inquiry: 
[I]n many cases, there is no way to determine which factors 
cut which way. If a man [commits a crime] in Duluth and 
another in Minneapolis, are the [crimes] geographically 
similar because they both took place in the same state, or are 
they geographically different because they took place 150 
miles apart? Asking that question is roughly equivalent to 
asking whether I am similar to a chimp.55
To apply this relevance analysis to the hypothetical sexual assault case 
used in our study, there were several significant differences between the 
other act and the charged crime. For example, in the other act, the 
defendant had met the accuser on prior occasions; in the charged crime, 
the defendant met the accuser only a short time before the alleged assault. 
In the other act, the defendant and the accuser were alone at the accuser’s 
home while the defendant gave her a backrub; in the charged crime, the 
defendant and the accuser were at a house party with several other people 
present. In the other act, the accuser was awake; in the charged crime, the 
accuser had fallen asleep.  
However, if a court were predisposed to admit the other-acts evidence, 
it could find numerous similarities on which to hang its hat. For example, 
both the other act and the charged crime involved alcohol consumption 
by the defendant and the accuser. Further, each of the accusers was in an 
impaired state—whether due to intoxication or sleep. Finally, both the 
other act and the charged crime occurred in private homes, rather than in 
public places.  
This example leads to an even larger problem: in many cases, courts 
do not undertake the similarity inquiry in good faith. Rather, they have 
decided ahead of time to admit the other acts. Then, they search for 
                                                                                                                     
substantial confusion. . . . [T]he rule itself has been enforced inconsistently throughout its 
history.”). The inconsistency of other-acts case law is not limited to Wisconsin or to this particular 
aspect of the analysis.
54. See, e.g., Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1392 (discussing Minnesota’s competing 
“marked” and “substantial” similarity tests for the admissibility of other-acts evidence). 
55. Id. at 1392–93. 
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commonalities—no matter how insignificant—to reach that 
predetermined conclusion.
For example, where a defendant is charged with the serious crime of 
“theft of a motor vehicle,” his prior bad acts of “receiving stolen 
property” in the form of “a television set” and other “electrical 
equipment” would strike most fair-minded readers as being very 
dissimilar to the charged crime.56 Nonetheless, in a short opinion 
unencumbered by legal analysis, an appellate court upheld a trial court’s 
admission of the petty, other-acts evidence, holding that passively 
receiving a stolen television set and electrical equipment were 
substantially similar to stealing an automobile.57 Why? Because the 
other-acts evidence and the charged crime were alleged to have occurred 
in the same county, and “[e]ach was an offense against property.”58
By cherry-picking the most superficial similarity—in the above case, 
the other act and the charged crime were both listed in the same chapter 
of the criminal code—courts can justify admitting nearly any prior act 
offered up by the prosecutor. In fact, a review of the case law in any state 
will reveal that “[c]ourts have a long history of admitting evidence with 
a fairly low degree of similarity.”59
Nonetheless, because there are often real and substantial differences 
between the other acts and the charged crime, defense counsel can usually 
make a strong argument that the other-acts evidence is dissimilar, and 
therefore not relevant.60 Such an analysis is also a prerequisite to raising 
additional challenges, described below.  
B. Unfair Prejudice
Defense counsel should consider arguing that the other acts should be 
excluded due to their unfair prejudice. Courts have defined unfair 
prejudice as the risk “that the jurors would be so influenced by the other 
acts evidence that they would be likely to convict the defendant because 
the other acts evidence showed him to be a bad man.”61 However, as 
                                                                                                                     
56. State v. Schulberg, No. C4-95-2709, Minn. App. LEXIS 1120, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 24, 1996). 
57. Id. at *3–4.
58. Id. at *4. 
59. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 17, at 1391, 1391–92 n.123 (citing numerous cases where 
the courts found defendants’ other acts to be sufficiently similar to the charged crimes despite 
their dramatic dissimilarity).
60. Each jurisdiction will have at least some published case law to support this argument. 
See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 39 (Wis. 1998) (overturning conviction because “a 
domestic disturbance between the defendant and his ex-wife in which they argued but there was 
no physical contact” was not sufficiently similar to the charged crime which allegedly “involved 
the defendant punching the complainant”).
61. Id. at 40. 
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described earlier, this unfair prejudice might be “presumed erased from 
the jury’s mind” once the court issues a cautionary instruction.62
Attempting to exclude other-acts evidence on grounds of unfair 
prejudice requires at least two steps. First, because courts typically 
require weighing the unfair prejudice against the probative value of the 
evidence,63 counsel should first demonstrate (as discussed in the previous 
Section)64 that the other acts are not relevant. If the other-acts evidence 
has little or no relevance—either because the permissible purpose for 
which it is offered is not in dispute, or because it does not tend to prove 
the permissible purpose for which it is offered—then its unfair prejudice 
will necessarily outweigh its probative value. The evidence, therefore, 
should be excluded.65
Second, because courts can easily avoid weighing unfair prejudice 
against the probative value by simply issuing a cautionary instruction, 
counsel should debunk the misconception that cautionary instructions 
cure unfair prejudice. This, in turn, can be accomplished from both a legal 
and empirical perspective. From a legal perspective, most states have at 
least some published cases holding that cautionary instructions were not 
adequate to address the risk of unfair prejudice, and defense counsel 
should locate and cite any factually similar cases.66
From an empirical perspective, the findings in this study and Article—
along with the findings in related studies testing the effectiveness of 
cautionary instructions in similar contexts67—demonstrate that such 
instructions are simply not effective. Here, an application of the Fifth 
                                                                                                                     
62. State v. Shillcutt, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).  
63. See Vivian M. Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under 
the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Weighing of Incremental Probity 
and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 454 (1993). 
64. See supra Section VI.A.
65. Even when the other-acts evidence is very similar to the charged crime, and therefore 
deemed to be relevant, counsel will still have an argument to exclude the evidence. The reason is 
that as the level of similarity increases, so does the unfair prejudice. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hans, 
supra note 36, at 1359 (discussing an increase in conviction rates when mock jurors “learned of a 
defendant’s previous record for crimes similar to that charged”). 
66. The most useful cases for this purpose are those where courts ultimately deemed the 
cautionary instruction inadequate because the other-acts evidence was highly inflammatory. In 
other cases, however, cautionary instructions can be deemed inadequate simply because the judge 
failed to competently draft the instruction. E.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 176 n.2 
(1997) (criticizing the trial court’s instruction to the jury to use the defendant’s prior conviction
to decide his “believability as a witness” when, in fact, the defendant never testified); Sullivan,
576 N.W.2d at 40 (“[I]n this case the cautionary instruction to the jury about the other acts 
evidence was too broad, and its cautionary effect was significantly diminished.”). 
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Circuit’s skunk analogy68 is useful. Our findings demonstrate that even a 
well-drafted cautionary instruction is about as effective as throwing a 
skunk into the jury box and then instructing the jury to consider the smell 
only on the issue of whether the skunk expelled sulfur-laden chemicals, 
but not to conclude that the skunk is a smelly animal. To assume the jury 
would—or even could—follow such an instruction is “unmitigated 
fiction.”69
C. The Stipulation
A third potential defense strategy is to stipulate to the element of the 
crime for which the other-acts evidence is being offered. In our study’s 
hypothetical sexual assault case, the defendant stipulated to the facts 
necessary to establish his identity. If a crime was in fact committed, the 
defendant conceded that he would have been the one who committed it. 
Such an approach would provide the state with conclusive proof on an 
element of the crime,70 thus rendering the other acts inadmissible. In 
some respects, this strategy circles back to the first two issues: the 
stipulation renders the other-acts evidence completely irrelevant; and, 
without any relevance, the probative value of the other acts would 
necessarily be substantially outweighed by their unfair prejudice.71
However, just as with the relevancy analysis, not all courts permit the 
defendant to use this strategy. Instead, some allow the prosecutor to reject
the stipulation in order to “prove his case his own way.”72 Stated more 
cynically, some states allow the prosecutor to harness the unfair prejudice 
of the other-acts evidence to win a conviction. And, to make matters more 
complicated, the law not only varies across states but, once again, can 
also vary within states.73
                                                                                                                     
68. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (analogizing the cautionary 
instruction to telling the jurors to ignore the smell of a skunk just thrown into the jury box). 
69. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(discussing the ineffectiveness of cautionary instructions).
70. For this reason, stipulations should not be offered casually, and only after consulting 
with the defendant and complying with all of the state’s procedural safeguards. 
71. See Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 456 (“The scaling of probative value and potential 
unfair prejudice . . . should take into consideration the defendant’s offer to remove the 
issue . . . from the case.”). 
72. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 177 (1997). Conversely, the Second Circuit 
has held that the defendant’s stipulation may prevent the government’s use of such evidence. See
United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1979). This, however, is the minority 
view. See, e.g., United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1985) (“This court has 
previously rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Manafzadeh because, in effect, it allows a 
defendant to remove intent as an element of the crime charged.”).
73. Here, once again, Wisconsin serves as an example of the legal chaos, as two lines of 
authority emerged: one where the defendant has the right to stipulate to an element of the crime 
and avoid the state’s other-acts evidence and another where he does not. See State v. Veach, 648 
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In any case, the analysis for stipulations begins with Old Chief v. 
United States.74 Pursuant to Old Chief, the defendant has the right, in 
some circumstances, to force the trial judge and the prosecutor to accept 
a stipulation.75 Further, defense counsel could even be found ineffective 
for failing to offer one.76 But this per se rule may be limited to situations 
where the evidence is being offered to prove a defendant’s legal status—
for example, his preexisting status as a convicted felon when charged 
with being a felon in possession of a firearm77—which is typically 
distinct from the classic uses of other-acts evidence.78
When the prosecutor offers other acts for purposes other than proving 
the defendant’s legal status, the trial judge or the prosecutor might be free 
to reject a defendant’s stipulation. For example, in State v. Veach,79 the 
court cited Old Chief and held that the trial judge properly rejected the 
stipulation because, rather than being used to prove the defendant’s legal 
status, the other-acts evidence was being offered to demonstrate his 
“intent or motive” or absence of “mistake.”80 The court seemed to justify 
this ruling on two different grounds, neither of which is persuasive. 
First, the Veach court stated that a defendant “may not stipulate or 
admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the 
Government chooses to present it.”81 But if this reasoning was valid, 
courts would never bother issuing a curative instruction, the purpose of 
which is to limit the full evidentiary force of other-acts evidence. In other 
words, the risk that accompanies other acts is that they could be used as 
character evidence. But the problem is not that “character is irrelevant; 
on the contrary,” a defendant’s character is relevant.82 The reason such 
evidence is excluded is the fundamental principle that “we try cases, 
                                                                                                                     
N.W.2d 447, 474 (Wis. 2002) (Crooks, J., concurring) (“The majority implies that it is overruling 
Wallerman and DeKeyser . . . but does not do so explicitly. In fact . . . the majority suggests that 
it is only modifying those cases by stating, ‘We do not mean to imply that Wallerman stipulations 
are per se invalid . . . .’”).
74. 519 U.S. at 174 (1997).
75. See id. (holding that, in limited circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial 
court to reject a defendant’s stipulation). 
76. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, No. 2014AP2302-CR, 2015 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2015) 
(per curiam) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to stipulate that the defendant 
had been charged with a felony at the time he allegedly committed the act that formed the basis 
for his bail jumping charge). 
77. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174. 
78. See Rodriguez, supra note 63, at 452.
79. 648 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Wis. 2002).
80. Id. at 453. 
81. Id. at 472 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186–87). 
82. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948).
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rather than persons.”83 And because a jury should only convict a
defendant “for what he did, not for who he is,”84 the defendant therefore 
should have the right to evade the full evidentiary force of the other-acts 
evidence.85
And this point leads us back to our empirical findings: cautionary 
instructions for other-acts evidence are not effective. Jurors will consider 
a defendant’s other acts for impermissible purposes such as character, and 
such consideration does lead jurors to convict at a much higher rate. Yet, 
this problem would be solved if the trial judge and the prosecutor were 
required to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the element for which 
the other acts are ostensibly being used.   
Second, the Veach court also stated that, unlike the stipulation in Old 
Chief, “the stipulation proposed by the defendant is simply inadequate to 
inform the jury of what is agreed to and what is in dispute, and to remove 
the issues from the case.”86 This can be a legitimate point. A defendant’s 
stipulation should be broad enough to completely resolve the issue. For 
example, the stipulation used in our study removed all doubt about 
identity, and the jury could only conclude that, if a crime was in fact 
committed, the defendant committed it. 
But drafting a stipulation broadly enough to satisfy a court may 
require even more creativity. In Veach, the defendant was charged with 
sexually touching a child and offered to stipulate that, if the touching 
occurred, it “was intentional and for the purpose of sexual 
gratification.”87 But the court concluded that such a stipulation was 
defective, as it “would not properly inform the jury that accident or 
mistake, two issues which the facts of this case obviously touched upon, 
were subject to the stipulation.”88
The court’s decision can only be described as disingenuous. If a 
defendant stipulates that an act “was intentional and for the purpose of 
sexual gratification,” the act is, by definition, not an “accident or 
mistake.” As the three dissenting judges stated, instead of being “honest 
                                                                                                                     
83. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) (citing United States v. Mitchell,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 348, 357 (1795)).
84. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977). 
85. Some “other acts” do lave legitimate evidentiary force that should not be diluted by a 
stipulation. However, such evidence does not fall into the category of other-acts evidence. Rather, 
because such acts are “so inextricably intertwined with, or intricately related to, the charged 
conduct that they help the fact-finder form a more complete picture of the crime,” they are 
considered an entirely separate class of evidence and are governed by different rules of 
admissibility. United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Schuster, 
supra note 8, at 961–70 (discussing the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine). 
86. Veach, 648 N.W.2d at 473.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and forthright . . . the majority engages in legal gymnastics to justify the 
admission of propensity evidence in contravention of the statute.”89
The dissenters’ harsh words ring true and provide the only plausible 
explanation for the majority’s pseudo-reasoning. They also provide a 
cautionary tale for defense counsel: If the defense decides to offer a 
stipulation on an element of the crime, the stipulation should be both 
broad and redundant.90
VII. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE STUDY
Our findings provide strong evidence that other-acts cautionary 
instructions are not effective, that jurors will use a defendant’s other acts 
for impermissible purposes, and that jurors exposed to other-acts 
evidence will convict at a much higher rate. Our findings also make a 
strong case for the expansion of Old Chief’s holding. That is, our justice 
system should permit a criminal defendant to stipulate not only to his 
legal status but also to other elements of the charged crime in order to 
avoid the unfairly prejudicial impact of other-acts evidence. 
However, critics may argue that our study has several limitations: our 
use of the case summary method, our use of a single criminal charge and 
fact pattern, the lack of deliberation by our mock jurors, our inability to 
observe the participants’ level of attention, and our failure to screen the 
participants for bias. We discuss these potential criticisms below.
A. Case Study Method
Our study employed a written case summary method, in which the
jury was provided with the elements of the charged crime, a summary of 
the witnesses’ testimony, and jury instructions. This is similar to the 
method that has been used in many peer-reviewed studies, including 
studies that examined the impact of a defendant’s personal characteristics 
on jury decision making.91 However, some social scientists have 
                                                                                                                     
89. Id. at 475 (Abrahamson, C.J., Bablitch & Bradley, JJ., dissenting).
90. One creative way of attempting to ensure that a stipulation is adequately broad is to 
remove the element of the crime from the jury instruction itself. To draw an analogy, when trial 
judges fail to instruct jurors on all of the elements of the charged crime, courts have held that such 
omissions can be harmless error. See, e.g., People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869, 872 (Cal. 1998) (stating 
that “removing [an] element of the crime from the jury’s consideration” does not invalidate the 
conviction). Therefore, eliminating elements of the crime from the jury instruction for purposes 
of a stipulation, when done on the defendant’s motion, should be legally permissible. Ensuring
the stipulation is adequately redundant, however, may require an even greater level of 
imagination.  
91. Wayne Weiten & Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation 
Paradigm, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 77 (1979); see also Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision 
Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 113, 129–30 (1987).
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expressed concerns about the ecological validity of these studies and have 
called for more realistic trial simulations.92
Conversely, other social scientists have noted the prohibitive costs of 
more realistic trial simulations93 or have failed to observe differences in 
the reactions of mock jurors to abbreviated or more elaborate case 
summaries.94 Therefore, “[e]ven highly artificial simulations are not 
inherently distorting and may actually inform us on relationships of real 
significance for law and human behavior.”95 Further, the more realistic 
trial simulation methods actually “provide a myriad of additional legally 
relevant and irrelevant bases on which to make a decision,” including, 
for example, a defendant’s or witness’s race and ethnicity.96
Seen in this light, the simplicity of the case summary method may 
actually be its strength. First, researchers who use the case summary 
method can eliminate extrajudicial factors, including race and ethnicity, 
that may have an impact on jurors’ decision-making processes.97 Second, 
the more abbreviated case summary method compresses events in time, 
thereby reducing the pernicious effect of forgetting, which can also affect 
jurors’ decision-making processes.98 And third, the case summary 
method allows researchers to test the impact of a specific component of 
a trial that may get lost in the clutter of a more complex trial simulation.99
For these reasons, “more abbreviated experimental stimulus materials,” 
such as the case summary method, “can play an important role in 
addressing some questions about jury behavior.”100
                                                                                                                     
92. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury 
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & LAW 589, 592 (1997) (“A better methodology is to 
provide a videotaped trial to participants. The videotaped format provides a highly engaging 
simulation, and is much more representative of an actual trial. Consequently, greater faith can be 
placed in studies using this methodology than experiments using transcripts or case summaries.”). 
93. Shari S. Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 561, 566 (1997).
94. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of 
Juror Behavior: A Methodological Note, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 89 (1989) (“Results 
provided no support for the contention that treatment effects act differently as a function of the 
length of the stimulus trial in which they are embedded. Rather, it is suggested that treatments 
used in simplified jury simulations may often show similar effects when examined in more 
realistic, complex settings if the treatments are comparable.”).
95. Id.
96. Diamond, supra note 93, at 564 (emphasis added). 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 563–64.
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. (arguing that while certain studies, such as those that test “the credibility of various 
types of expert testimony” demand “a fairly elaborate simulation,” other studies can be 
accomplished using “a less extensive trial stimulus”).
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B. Single Fact Pattern
All empirical studies are flawed in the sense that methodological 
decisions designed to solve one problem often exacerbate another. For 
example, controlled experiments that use random assignment, such as 
ours, solve the problem of causal ambiguity, i.e., determining what 
produced the effect. However, the desire to control extraneous variables 
may constrain the researcher’s ability to generalize the study’s results 
beyond the specific conditions tested.
We used a single fact pattern that we held constant across test 
conditions. Consequently, we cannot assume an identical outcome for 
different fact patterns. We therefore encourage future researchers to 
replicate our study but to use different test materials when doing so, 
including, for example, a different charged crime, fact pattern, other-acts 
evidence, and permissible purpose for the other-acts evidence.
C. Lack of Deliberations
Our study tested the impact of the cautionary instruction on individual
mock jurors’ verdicts. These mock jurors did not deliberate as a group 
before reaching their decisions. In this sense, our study differed from an 
actual jury trial and some other jury simulation studies.
Some studies show that “deliberations sometimes do influence 
outcomes” including, for example, a study in which juror deliberations 
reduced individual juror biases and made them more likely to follow the 
judge’s instructions.101 However, the evidence on the impact of 
deliberations is, at best, mixed.102
For example, several studies have tested the impact of deliberations 
on the physical attractiveness bias, i.e., the tendency for jurors to perceive 
and treat attractive defendants more favorably than plain-looking 
defendants.103 One study found that deliberation mitigated the physical 
attractiveness bias.104 A later study, however, found that deliberation 
exacerbated the bias.105 Most surprising of all, a third study found a 
                                                                                                                     
101. Id. at 565.
102. Id.; see also Lieberman & Sales, supra note 92, at 635 (“On the basis of these 
contradictory findings, we cannot assume that deliberation will eliminate the problem of 
incomprehensible instructions.”). 
103. Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical Attractiveness 
Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 727 (2008).
104. Richard R. Izzett & W. Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of Defendant 
Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 271 (1974).
105. Robert J. MacCoun, The Emergence of Extralegal Bias, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303,
303 (1990).
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reversal of the expected effect: Mock jurors who deliberated were biased 
against the attractive defendant.106
Numerous published studies involving mock jurors do not include 
deliberations.107 Further, in the end, requiring mock jurors to deliberate 
before rendering a verdict is unlikely to change the observed pattern of 
verdicts across conditions. Rather, “[t]he prevailing view . . . is that 
deliberations play a minor role in determining jury verdicts because the 
predeliberation majority generally prevails in the end.”108
D. Participant Attention Level
When using Mechanical Turk, as opposed to collecting data in a 
laboratory setting, it is not possible to directly observe the study 
participants’ level of attention. However, before results were known, we 
were able to reject participants who spent fewer than three minutes on the 
task. We also tested our mock jurors’ attention level through the use of a 
post-verdict attention-check question. As indicated above, these results 
were encouraging. Mock jurors answered the question correctly 88% of 
the time, thus demonstrating that they devoted adequate attention to the 
case study materials before rendering their verdicts.
Furthermore, the issue of inattentive jurors is a problem that exists 
with real-life jurors as well. Far worse than merely being inattentive, 
sleeping jurors are often tolerated as long as the trial judge concludes that 
the jurors were not sleeping too long, or that the evidence they missed 
was not important enough, to justify a new trial.109
E. Participant Bias
In theory, biased jurors are excused from jury duty and do not 
participate in actual trials. In our Mechanical Turk study, we were not 
able to screen participants in advance for potential bias. However, four 
things mitigate this potential problem. First, many biases—for example, 
racial bias—would not have been factors in our case. Our hypothetical 
defendants’ (and even the witnesses’) race was not provided.
                                                                                                                     
106. Patry, supra note 103, at 731.
107. See, e.g., Bette L. Bottoms et al., Gender Differences in Jurors’ Perceptions of 
Infanticide Involving Disabled and Non-Disabled Infant Victims, 35 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
127, 131 (2011); Joanna D. Pozzulo et al., The Effects of Victim Gender, Defendant Gender, and 
Defendant Age on Juror Decision Making, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 47, 54 (2010); Cynthia J. 
Najdowski et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Juvenile Defendants: The Influence of Intellectual 
Disability, Abuse History, and Confession Evidence, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 401, 406, 415 (2009).
108. Diamond, supra note 93, at 564.   
109. See State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 346, 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the 
denial of defendant’s motion for new trial despite undisputed evidence of three jurors sleeping 
through evidentiary portions of trial).
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Second, in actual courtrooms across the country, biased jurors find 
their way onto juries. In fact, to exclude a subjectively biased juror, all of 
the following must happen: the would-be juror must be aware of his or 
her bias; the judge or the attorneys must devise questions to expose that
particular bias; and the would-be juror must actually admit his or her bias 
to a roomful of fellow citizens. For all of these things to happen is a rare 
occurrence indeed.
Third, even when a juror is, by all accounts, objectively biased, he or 
she may still be permitted to serve on the jury. Perhaps the most egregious 
example occurred when a court permitted the prosecutor’s own employee 
to serve on the defendant’s jury, finding that the employee–employer 
relationship between the juror and the prosecutor was not sufficient to 
justify the juror’s removal.110
Finally, there is a fourth mitigating factor: the random assignment of 
the study participants to test conditions. The virtue of random assignment 
is that, when used with large numbers of study participants, it produces 
groups that are statistically equivalent to each other in all respects. Each 
group has roughly the same number of mock jurors, the same number of
men and women, the same number of well-educated and poorly educated 
persons, and the same number of biased and unbiased individuals.
When test groups are statistically equivalent at the outset; receive 
different evidence on identity; and then convict at different rates, we can 
be quite certain that the different conviction rates were produced by the 
different evidence and not by personal characteristics of the mock jurors 
in a particular group. In plain language, random assignment creates a 
level playing field where the effects of bias are distributed equally across 
the test conditions. Therefore, we can attribute the result—a difference in 
conviction rates—only to the variable that was manipulated.
CONCLUSION
While evidence of a defendant’s bad character is generally not 
admissible at trial, courts will still permit the prosecutor to introduce 
evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts. In some jurisdictions, the 
                                                                                                                     
110. See State v. Smith, 716 N.W.2d 482, 493 (Wis. 2006). The dissent, however, offered a 
far more rational view: 
An objectively reasonable person in the place of the challenged prospective juror 
would not ordinarily be able to separate his or her economic and loyalty interests 
from the determinations he or she would be required to make as juror. An 
employee of a district attorney’s office should therefore be struck as a juror for 
cause when that office is prosecuting a case. 
Id. at 495 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, this problem—the potential for participant 
bias—again mirrors the problems encountered with real-life jurors.
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/2
2018] CONVICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTER 377
prosecutor’s only substantive hurdle is that the other-acts evidence must 
also be relevant for some permissible purpose—such as the defendant’s 
identity, intent, or absence of accident—in addition to demonstrating bad 
character.111
In order to protect the defendant against the impermissible character 
inference, courts will issue a cautionary instruction telling the jury to 
consider the other acts only for their legally proper purpose. Courts then 
blindly assume that such cautionary instructions will erase all prejudice 
from the jurors’ minds.112
Given that this judicial assumption does not square with the 
psychological research on the way the human mind functions, we 
empirically tested this claim. We recruited 249 mock jurors, all of whom 
read the same case summary of a hypothetical criminal trial. Mock jurors 
were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, each of which 
received different evidence on the issue of identity.113
Mock jurors in Group A received conclusive evidence on identity in 
the form of a stipulation. One-third of these mock jurors convicted the 
defendant. Mock jurors in Group B received less certain evidence on 
identity in the form of the defendant’s somewhat similar other act. Group 
B also received a cautionary instruction. Nearly half of these mock jurors 
convicted the defendant, even though they were instructed that the 
evidence could be used only for the purpose of identity and not to 
determine the defendant’s character. This nearly 50% increase in
conviction rates was highly significant (p < .02). Jurors in Group B (who 
received the other-acts evidence) were also more certain in their verdicts 
(p < .04).114
Our findings are strong empirical evidence that other-acts evidence 
increases the likelihood of conviction and that cautionary instructions for 
other acts are not effective. Given this, defense counsel should consider 
offering a stipulation to the element of the crime for which the other-acts 
evidence is ostensibly being offered. Further, defense counsel should 
consider using the empirical findings discussed in this Article—with or 
without the use of a stipulation—to demonstrate that the unfair prejudice 
associated with other-acts evidence substantially outweighs any 
probative value and, therefore, the other acts should be excluded from the 
defendant’s trial.115
                                                                                                                     
111. See supra Part II.
112. See supra Part III.
113. See supra Sections IV.A–IV.D.
114. See supra Section IV.E.
115. See supra Part VI.
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